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A Meditaon
on the
65th
Infantry
Silvia Alvarez Curbelo
The article was translated from
Spanish by Blanca Vizquez.
What first comes to mind is asphalt. The 
65th Infantry is the "65th/ that 
inhospitable, choked thoroughfare that 
runs from Río Piedras to Carolina. Not 
far from Rio Piedras, though, you do 
become aware of the hidden reference 
point behind the smog, store signs and 
countless fast food joints. A simple 
memorial dedicates the avenue to the 
Puerto Rican regiment, and off to one 
side in the San Agustín community the 
names of the streets are dedicated to 
the dead and the decorated.
Despite its fallen heroes, the historical 
heritage of the 65th is faint in the 
national memory. The veterans of the 
regiment are practically the only ones 
who preserve the memory. Today, men 
in their sixties maintain the war, 
chronicle strikingly alive. These are the 
men Pedro Flores said goodbye to as 
they left for war, leaving behind their 
childhood sweethearts and resigned 
mothers. Edgardo Rodríguez Julia, one 
of the earlier inhabitants of the "65th" 
("...the 65th, still pretty desolate when 
I was 11, was the incomplete promise of 
social mobility") associates the street 
(in Puertorriqueños) with the "studs" 
and the "peacocks"; they are the tough 
guys a la Daniel Santos. They are the 
boys of Korea.
The distant history of the 65th begins 
w ith the period of m ilitary rule 
after the U.S. invasion. Founded by 
congressional legislation in 1899, it was 
known as the Puerto Rican Volunteer 
Regiment, and fit with the anomalous 
situation regarding citizenship created 
by the citizenship clause of the Foraker 
Law (1900). With the First World War 
and the concession of U.S. citizenship in 
1917, the regiment was renamed the 
Puerto Rican Infantry Regiment of the 
United States, and saw service in the 
Panama Canal zone. In 1920 it was 
renamed the 65th U.S. Infantry.
During the Second World War, the 
regiment took part in the African, 
Italian and French campaigns and in the 
occupation of Germany. However, in 
spite of its dead and wounded, the 65th 
still wasn't considered a combat unit in 
the conflict. Its battalions were used 
principally as support troops for other 
units. In the Seventh Army, the Puerto 
Ricans were spoken of in a derogatory 
way as "palace guards."
Isolated, considered generically unfit 
for combat, the Puerto Rican soldiers 
were seen through the same prism as 
the Black American troops. In a racially
organized army such as that of the U.S., 
abilities and duties were determined 
beforehand. After the Allied victory in 
1945, the 65th returned to Puerto Rico 
and was stationed in Losey Field in 
Juana Diaz and Henry Barracks in Cayey. 
When William Harris took charge in 
1949, the image had changed little: the 
65th was viewed as an ethnic unit 
destined for secondary tasks.
That is how Harris remembers it in his 
book Puerto Rico's Fighting 65th U.S. 
Infantry. Sentimental and simplistic at 
times, Harris's book gradually develops 
into a powerful story. He covers two 
critical years (1949-1951) in which the 
regiment defined itself as a unit, giving 
itself its emblematic name: the 
Borinqueneers. Actively deployed 
during the war, it became, without a 
doubt, the best fighting unit in the 
Korean War. Since his book is 
autobiographical, one might expect 
Harris to make himself the focal point 
of that change. But he does not, even 
though being in charge of the 65th 
Infantry during those two years was 
obviously Harris's moment of military 
glory. Yet the colonel's role is mediated 
by his perspicacious account of a process 
which superseded him even while 
decisively elevating his command.
Harris could not have imagined that the 
65th would thus come into its own 
when he apprehensively directed the 
65th's most important maneuvers 
in February 1950. Against all his 
expectations, the 65th, in a simulated 
invasion of Vieques during the so-called 
Portrex Maneuvers, beat the "enemy": 
the 3rd Infantry Division, the most 
decorated U.S. Army division in the two 
world wars. That surprise victory 
intrigued the division "top brass" (How 
could the "rum and coke" brigade beat 
the Army's most d eco rated  division?), 
but not eno ugh  to make any 
real d ifference in its image. The 
65th remained a marginalized unit 
("hum iliated" in Harris's words), 
relegated to maintenance tasks.
The fact is that something complex 
had happened in Vieques, a 
combination of forces and motivations 
that can't really be understood in 
terms of m ilitary diagnosis, things 
having to do with machismo, dignity, 
self love- were all definitive in forging 
a powerful identity.
Four months after the maneuvers, the 
Korean conflict began. On August 23rd 
the regiment left San Juan. While on
the high seas, it received instructions to 
go directly to Korea, skipping the 
customary stopover in Japan. Korea was 
no longer an "incident," as President 
Truman had insisted, but a war in the 
full sense of the word and every man 
was needed.
The landing in Pusan coincided with the 
beginning of the U.S. counter- offensive 
against the spectacular advance of the 
North Koreans and the guerrillas 
in the  So u th . The 65th w o u ld  
soon win the nickname of the "fire 
brigade" for its ubiquitous role in the 
war's extensive terrain. Its fame would 
spread above all when General Douglas 
MacArthur's desperate campaign failed 
against the renewed resistance of the 
North Koreans, and Chinese volunteers 
entered the conflict.
U.S. units, prematurely convinced of 
their invulnerability, fell into one of the 
oldest military traps, overextending 
their lines almost to the Manchurian 
border. When the North Koreans- 
Chinese counterattacked, the front lines 
were in pandemonium. It was in the 
midst of this chaos that the 65th acted 
with maximum effectiveness.
While unit after unit of the Eighth Army 
along with the regular forces of South 
Korea were disorganized, and were 
suffering astonishing rates of desertions 
as their casualties mounted, the 65th 
displayed incredible coherence. 
Cemented by a sense of solidarity, they 
were sustained by a support system 
fueled by letters from home, foodstuffs 
sent by hundreds of mothers, girlfriends 
and wives, and songs dedicated to the 
combatants. As they struggled against 
the cold in the hills, they dreamt of 
festivals and folk songs, nostalgic for 
their distant homeland.
Further reinforced by the group of 
Puerto Rican non-commissioned officers 
(NCO's) who "translated" the war for 
the vulnerable privates, the soldiers of 
the 65th displayed a distinct identity.
On Christmas Eve 1950, U.S. troops, in 
full retreat, were being pushed to the 
sea, which MacArthur's press corps tried 
to reconcile with the triumphant 
predictions of prior weeks. Among 
them were the elite troops of the First 
Marine Infantry Division. It was the 65th 
that protected the rear guard of those 
Marines, the Puerto Ricans being the 
last to leave the "Dunkirk" of 
Humhang. The Puerto Ricans celebrated 
Christmas alongside the transports
fleeing south. The Third Division 
 received a presidential citation for their
actions in saving the bulk of the U.S. 
forces on the Korean front. Inexplicably, 
according to Harris, the 6Sth was not 
singled out and none of its members 
received the Medal of Honor in spite of 
their proven acts of valor.
The following months of war were 
significantly different from the first 
phase of the fighting. On the one 
hand, differences between General 
MacArthur's anti-Chinese and "gungho" 
rhetoric and the Truman administration's 
fears of a Third World War if the Soviets 
intervened, resulted in the summary 
removal of MacArthur in April of 1951. 
On the other hand, the U.S. offensive, 
which succeeded in gaining back a 
great part of the territory lost in 
December, did not alter the balance of 
forces, and established instead a 
demarcation line at the 38th parallel. 
The war took on other exigencies: 
territory had to be won and maintained 
against the constant threat of invading 
"hordes" of Chinese. It was the most 
violent phase of the war and the 65th 
would again prove to be the most 
mobile unit in a confused theater of 
war, with its changing orders and 
ferocious resistance. As "fire 
extinguishers" the 65th undertook an 
intricate web of maneuvers that sent 
them from one end of the peninsula to 
another without significant rest 
periods. Only its considerable collective 
inner strength can explain how the 
regiment succeeded in surviving the 
turn of events.
The start of the peace talks in June of 
1951 marked the last stage of the war. 
The Korean conflict became a war of 
static positionings, of trench warfare 
over minuscule modifications. But as 
documented so clearly in the First World 
War, under such circumstances the 
degree of irrationality rises and 
psychological fatigue sets in, as 
casualties mount over insignificant 
gains that could only be momentarily 
retained. As the nature of the war was 
changing, the Pentagon accelerated the 
rotation of troops. While shortening 
the time troops stayed at the front, this 
tactic also undermined the stability of 
fighting units.
As the irrationality of the war grew, and 
the networks of solidarity and 
mediations between the front and the 
U.S. high command dissolved, the 65th 
became totally destabilized and exposed.
I t  w a s  t h e  
m o s t  v i o l e n t
p h a s e  o f  t h e
w a r  a n d  t h e  6 5 t h  
w o u l d  a g a i n  p r o v e  
t o  b e  t h e  m o s t  
m o b i l e  u n i t  i n  a
c o n f u s e d  t h e a t e r  o f  
w a r ,  w i t h  i t s  c h a n g i n g  
o r d e r s  a n d  f e r o c i o u s  
r e s i s t a n c e .
The dramatic events of September and 
October of 1952, involving members of 
the 65th were directly related to the 
loss of identity suffered by the 
regiment, eroded as it was by an 
incomprehensible war that could not be 
won but was measured by the taking of 
one or another hill mere pawns at the 
negotiating table. Facing superior 
forces which dominated the terrain, 
various Puerto Rican fighters sent on 
suicide missions refused to fight, taking 
the position that orders which were 
impossible to follow should not be 
obeyed. Paradoxically, the decisions 
made in the hills at Kelly and Jackson 
can be also read as collective 
affirmations, as a positioning of identity 
in the face of that irrationality. Puerto 
Rican identity was thus affirmed by 
both participation and by absence in 
these two sterile North Korean hills.
Two minor military operations, today 
no more than casual references in the 
books about the Korean war, illuminate 
all the complexities and antagonisms 
surrounding the 65th. Everything would 
change for the regiment after the 
fateful events at Jackson Heights on
October 28th, 1952. At the end of that 
day the lieutenant in charge of 
Company A, on temporary assignment 
to the Second Battalion of the 
Regiment, and dozens of Puerto Rican 
soldiers were arrested. They were 
accused of knowingly evading battle 
with the enemy and of disobeying the 
orders of their superiors. The response 
of the U.S. high command was 
implacable: more than 90 soldiers were 
tried and court marshalled. The trials 
were quick; the defense was hastily 
assembled. With one exception all those 
accused were found guilty. The 
sentences varied, but in general they 
were disproportionately severe (some 
received 16-year sentences), in spite of 
inconclusive proof and the confused 
testimony of witnesses.
The press of the time tells of a nation 
reacting with disbelief and pain at the 
accusations of cowardice and desertion, 
and feeling diminished and 
overwhelmed. A nation moving 
inconclusively between two cultures 
experienced one of its icons as fallen. 
The press also records the discomfort of 
a government having to manage an 
affair that inevitably had racial over­
tones and smacked of old colonial 
relations at a time when a new state 
apparatus the Commonwealth-was 
being inaugurated. The Puerto Rican 
cases also provided the newly installed 
second party the Puerto Rican 
Independence Party (PlP)-the 
opportunity to open its first political 
debate. From the senatorial chambers, 
the leader of the PIP, Gilberto 
Concepción de Gracia, would force the 
government of Luis Muñoz Marín to 
intervene and request clemency for the 
convicted soldiers. Concepción de 
Gracia personally defended more than
30 soldiers in their appeals process.
A reading of the 65th and its role calls 
for predictable categories racism, 
colonial troops in imperial armed 
forces, wars of attrition that are valid, 
useful and necessary. Notwithstanding, I 
think it also imperative to recover and 
reclaim the memory of the 65th as an 
illuminating cultural space in which “in 
some way" as Antonio Benitez Rojo 
would say, nationality was highlighted. 
Even in a zone that is totally "anti­
national" the Army of the United States 
national affirmation operates in 
unforseen and profound ways.
Reprinted article. Cenrto Journal of the Center for 
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